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We develop a model to study the impact of changes in price sensitivity on the firm as it 
introduces multiple generations of a durable product where unit costs are a convex 
function of quality. We incorporate the psychological processes of sensitization and 
habituation into a model of discretionary purchasing of replacement products motivated 
by past experience. When price sensitivity decreases with each purchase (sensitization), 
the myopic firm offers a higher quality product at a much higher price with each 
generation. When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (habituation), the 
myopic firm engages in price skimming. When sensitization is followed by habituation, 
the myopic firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is willing to pay for, 
leading to a steep drop-off in sales and profits. The actions of the forward-looking firm 
depend on the discount rate. A firm with a low discount rate builds its customer base 
before offering a higher quality and higher priced product. In contrast, a firm with a high 
discount rate quickly increases price and quality following the same path to falling 
profits of the myopic firm. These results provide insight into the firm and consumer 
behaviors underlying the phenomenon of “performance oversupply” identified in the 
innovation literature.  
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The Effects of Sensitization and Habituation in Durable Goods Markets  
1. Introduction 
Owning and using a durable product can change the way consumers feel about it. 
As they gain experience, their interests may change. For example, Youn, Song and 
MacLachlan (2007) find that brand preferences and price sensitivities for rock climbing 
equipment evolve as consumers gain more experience with the sport over time. Such 
changes influence the demand for replacement products and should be of great interest to 
managers.   
We often observe that consumers replace a durable good not because of 
failure, but to gain greater performance. There is ample anecdotal evidence of this 
type of replacement buying. Some weekend golfers replace their drivers every season 
with the latest version, seeking a few more yards off the tee. Cyclists replace a 
functioning bike component with one that is marginally lighter, but certainly much 
more expensive. Audiophiles may buy a new piece of equipment to improve the 
reproduction of sounds outside the range of human hearing. Such behavior is not 
limited to individuals. Every year, auto racing teams spend increasing amounts of 
money seeking very small incremental improvements in performance.  
This is a very interesting yet understudied area of dynamic consumer behavior. 
When consumers often seek out a more advanced version of a durable product before 
their existing product has reached the end of its useful life, such replacement purchases 
are completely “discretionary” (Bayus 1992). However, this motivation for a 
replacement purchase is very different from those identified in the existing literature on 
durable goods, e.g. low prices (Bayus 1988), styling (Bayus 1991) or changed family 
circumstances (Gabor and Granger 1972; Pickering, 1975). In this study, product 
performance is the key motivator for discretionary replacement buying. We assume that, 
when buying a replacement product, consumers will only consider a product that offers 
performance superior to the product they already own.  
This type of discretionary repurchasing raises a number of interesting and 
important questions. For example, how are the optimal levels of price and quality 
affected by decreases in consumer price sensitivity? What happens if a consumer’s price 
sensitivity increases after multiple replacement purchases? How does the requirement 
  
for better and better products over time affect the nature of the market (sales patterns, 
level of repeat purchases, profits, etc.)?  
To address these questions, we build on recent theoretical research by Watheiu 
(2004) who considered the impact of periodic consumption on the price sensitivity on 
frequently consumed products (e.g. food). We examine how decreases in price 
sensitivity (sensitization) or increases in price sensitivity (habituation) affect the optimal 
price and quality over time for a myopic firm selling durable products to new and 
experienced buyers. We explore the implications for the firm of sensitization followed 
by the onset of habituation for the myopic and forward-looking firm.  
We find that when price sensitivity decreases with each purchase (sensitization), 
the myopic firm should offer a higher quality product at a much higher price with each 
generation. When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (habituation), the 
myopic firm will engage in price skimming. When sensitization is followed by 
habituation, the myopic firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is 
willing to pay for, leading to a steep drop-off in sales and profits. The actions of the 
forward-looking firm depend on the discount rate. A firm with a low discount rate builds 
its customer base before offering a higher quality and higher priced product. In contrast, 
a firm with a high discount rate quickly increases price and quality following the same 
path to falling profits of the myopic firm. These results provide insight into the firm and 
consumer behaviors underlying the phenomenon of “performance oversupply” identified 
in the innovation literature (Christensen, 1997). 
In order to incorporate these types of changes in consumer preferences, we use a 
very different approach rather than the typical innovation model (Bass 1969; Teng and 
Thompson 1996) and the traditional models of durable good monopolies (Gul, 
Sonneschein, and Wilson, 1986; Tirole, 2003). First, price and quality as well as 
consumer heterogeneity are endogenous. Second, we model first purchases and repeat 
purchases using a random utility (i.e. logit) formulation (as in Kim, Srivastava and Han 
2001). Third, and most important, we incorporate a “replacement rule” to model the 
effect of owning earlier versions on replacement purchases. Usually, replacement 
purchases are based on a product’s useful life (e.g. Kamakura and Balasubramanian, 
1987; Bayus, 1988). In our model, experienced consumers only consider repurchasing if 
  
the product available is better than the one they already own (Rogers 1995). Therefore, 
in order to sell to experienced buyers, the firm must offer a better product.  
While very realistic, this assumption comes at the price of model tractability. The 
replacement rule introduces significant discontinuities into the objective function for the 
firm. These discontinuities preclude a closed-form model solution. Therefore, following 
the example of Dasu and Tong (2010) among others, we analyze a series of multi-period 
scenarios to ascertain the effects of decreasing and/or increasing price sensitivities on the 
firm’s optimal price, quality and profits over a fixed number of product generations. 
Our study builds on the current research on how consumer preferences change 
with experience e.g.: Kim, Srivastava, and Han 2001; Mallik and Chhajed, 2006; 
Matsubayashi and Yamada, 2008; Youn, Song and MacLahan 2007), ours is the first 
model we know of that focuses on the important issue of improved performance as a 
determinant of discretionary replacement purchasing. In the next section, a brief 
literature review is followed by the basic model assumptions. The results of our model 
analyses are then presented in detail. The final section summarizes our contributions and 
offers directions for future research.   
2. Brief Literature Review 
 Much of the prior research on the evolution of consumer preferences focuses on 
consumer packaged goods. These studies seek to empirically determine the direction and 
extent of changes in price sensitivity over time (e.g., Heilman, Bowman and Wright 
2000; Erdem and Sun 2001). An exception is Youn, Song and MacLahan (2007) who 
find that, as consumers gain experience with rock climbing, their price sensitivity 
decreases. At the same time, experienced climbers tend to prefer shoes that are lighter, 
more flexible and provide greater sensitivity leading to changes in brand preferences. 
 Recent theoretical work by Wathieu (2004) examines the impact of consumption 
over time on price sensitivity. Using results from the behavior psychology literature (e.g. 
McSweeney, Hinson and Cannon, 1996), Wathieu (2004) suggests that consumption 
over time could lead price sensitivity to evolve along one of two distinct paths: 
sensitization or habituation. If it does occur, sensitization is usually associated with the 
initial stages of consumption. At this stage, customers become increasingly interested in 
consuming the product as they experience the promised benefits. Sensitization results in 
  
a decrease a price sensitivity as they continue to consume it over time (Wathieu 2004). 
The sensitization stage has parallels with addictive processes since current consumption 
leads to an increase in future consumption (Becker and Murphy 1988). 
 In the case of some durable products, sensitization is a by-product of increased 
experience with the product which, in turn, increases a consumer’s expertise and 
familiarity (Hoch and Deighton 1989) while reducing perceived risk. Zhao, Meyer and 
Han (2005) find that consumers are often attracted to new versions of products that offer 
additional features, even if these features are never used.  
Over time, continued consumption usually leads to habituation. As consumers 
get accustomed to consuming the same product over and over, their interest may wane 
and their price sensitivity increases. In markets for frequently purchased packed goods, 
consumers may engage in variety-seeking behavior (McAlister and Pessemier, 1982) or 
they may stockpile the product when it is on sale. For frequently purchased products, the 
onset of habituation depends on frequency and intensity of consumption (Wathieu, 
2004).  
For some durable products, increased price sensitivity could occur with the first 
purchase. For example, Thompson, Hamilton and Rust (2005) found that consumers can 
be overwhelmed by the complexity of new products with a great variety of features. 
Their experimental work finds that consumers can suffer from “feature fatigue” which 
reduces their interest in “new and improved” models of products already owned.  
In our study, we model how the influences of sensitization and habituation 
separately affect a myopic firm’s decisions regarding price and quality when selling to 
new and experienced customers over multiple generations. We then investigate how 
sensitization followed by habituation affects the decisions of myopic and forward-
looking firms.   
3. Model Formulation 
 In order to isolate the effects of changes in price sensitivity on repeat purchases, 
we limit our analysis to the situation of a monopolist setting the profit maximizing price 
and quality of a single product over a number of generations. This is consistent with the 
analytical models of a durable goods monopolist introducing sequential innovations 
(e.g., Dhebar 1994; Kornish, 2001).  
  
 We further depart from the existing literature on “upgrade” purchasing wherein 
the firm can price discriminate based on previous purchasing (Fudenberg and Tirole 
1998). We assume that, in a given generation, the firm charges the same price to and 
provides the same quality level for all consumers.  
The monopolist’s profit in generation g is determined by:  
(1)                             gggg SMCP )( −=pi  
In generation g, Pg is price, MCg is marginal cost, and Sg is sales. Sales in a given 
generation (Sg) are the sum of the purchase probabilities for all consumers that purchase 
in generation g (see, for example, Kim, Srivastava and Han 2001). These probabilities 
are determined at the individual consumer level by the current price and quality as well 
as the consumer’s purchase history, i.e. the quality levels of products already purchased. 
As in Moorthy and Png (1992), the quality variable represents all non-price product 
attributes such as performance, reliability, durability, and so on (Garvin, 1987). 
The extant research on multi-generational durables such as software, computer 
chips, etc. (see e.g. Pangburn and Sundaresan 2009) assumes that the firm faces very 
high development costs and very low marginal costs2. In such markets, firms usually 
practice skim pricing (e.g. Beskano and Wilson 1990). By setting initial prices high and 
reducing them later, the firm maximize profits via price discrimination. However, in 
such markets, consumers learn the patterns of price changes and build expectations about 
future price reductions (see, e.g., Song and Chintagunta 2003). Some forward-looking 
consumers may delay purchasing and wait for the price to fall. The composition of the 
market with regard to the number of consumers who will purchase immediately versus 
waiting has an important impact of the firm’s pricing over time. In models where quality 
is endogenously set, fixed spending on R&D determines the level of quality offered to 
customers (Fishman and Rob, 2000).  
In our model, we consider a very different relationship between costs and quality. 
As noted above, the extant literature generally assumes that, in order to attain a desired 
level of quality, the firm must invest in a given level of fixed investment. In our model, 
the influence of quality on costs is variable. Specifically, we assume that unit marginal 
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 In other situations, it is assumed that costs are lower over time, due to learning or experience curve 
effects, as the cumulative number of units produced increases (e.g., Teng and Thompson 1996). 
  
cost is a fixed quadratic function of quality. This assumption is consistent with empirical 
studies of cost behavior (e.g., Foster 1994) as well as prior analytical research 
(Matsubayashi and Yamada, 2008, Balachander and Srinivasan 1994, Moorthy 1988). 
As a simplifying assumption, we assume zero fixed costs (e.g. Kim and Chhajed, 2000; 
Mallik and Chhajed, 2006).  
Unit marginal cost as a function of quality is given by: 
(2)                                                2210)( gggg XrXrrXMC ++=                   
   
where Xg is the quality level for generation g. The cost intercept and coefficients are 
represented by r0, r1 and r2 respectively are fixed to reflect a constant technology frontier. 
This cost assumption has important implications for the consumer. Since providing 
higher levels of quality cost the firm more, consumers should not expect that prices will 
fall over time3.  
In every period, the monopolist chooses quality (X) and price (P) to solve: 
(3)                                               ( ) gggPX SMCPMax − ,          
Note that generation g is of undetermined length. It could be months or years (the 
optimal timing of product generations is discussed in Druehl, Schmidt and Souza 2009). 
Each period represents a single generation of the durable product.  
3.1 Consumer Demand Model 
 Our model of consumer demand is based on a random utility model and involves 
both first purchases and discretionary replacements (e.g., Kim, Srivastava and Han, 
2001).  
The utility gµ of a product in generation g is given by:  
(4)                                             gcgg PX αβµ −+Φ= 0      where  
• Xg is the quality level for generation g 
                                                 
3
 However, it is important to note that almost all of the research on “forward looking” consumers is usually 
based on one of two assumptions, either fixed costs are very high and there are differences in price 
sensitivity across consumer (leading to price discrimination over time) or that costs fall over time due to 
experience curve effects. We are looking at very different situation in which increases in quality come at a 
high cost. It is unclear whether consumers anticipate price increases or decreases as new generations of the 
product are introduced. Therefore, we assume that consumers are myopic in the sense that they do not 
anticipate price changes over time. 
 
  
• 0 is a fixed market-level propensity for purchase in this category4.  
• β  represents the consumer’s sensitivity to quality (Nevo 2000) 
• Pg is the price of the product in generation g  
• cα is the price sensitivity, which changes according to the number of purchases (c) a 
consumer has made. 
It is important to note that price sensitivity changes due to the number of 
purchases made by the consumer and not due to the passage of time. In the first period, 
every consumer has the same price sensitivity. With each purchase, a consumer’s price 
sensitivity changes, decreasing under sensitization and increasing under habituation. For 
those consumers who have not yet purchased in the category, their price sensitivity stays 
constant until such time that a purchase is made.  
This approach allows us to model customers who are making an initial purchase 
as having different price sensitivities than those customers who are considering a 
discretionary repeat purchase. For example, under sensitization, a consumer who has 
made a purchase would have a lower price sensitivity when evaluating the current 
generation product than a consumer who has not yet purchased in the category. The lower 
price sensitivity of repeat purchasers is a reflection of their increasing interest in the 
product category which arises from product ownership and usage (Hoch and Deighton 
1989).   
The probability of purchase Pr(αc, Xg, Pg) for consumers in generation g with 
price sensitivity αc given c, the number of purchases already made, is formulated as a 
logit model. After having purchased the product, consumers will only consider 
repurchasing if the quality of the current generation product is superior to the quality of 
product purchased most recently. We refer to this constraint as a “replacement rule.” This 
condition reflects the situation in which replacement will not be considered until a better, 
more capable, or more powerful version becomes available (Rogers 1995).  
At the individual level, the probability of purchase is given by:  
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The sales (Sg) in any generation g are equal to the sum of all these probabilities 
across all consumers. As in prior research on multi-generational purchasing (e.g. Dhebar, 
1994; Kornish, 2001), we assume consumers buy no more than one unit in each 
generation and there is no secondary market for used products.  
3.2 Consumer Price Sensitivity Dynamics 
 Before their first purchase, we assume that all consumers have the same price 
and quality sensitivities. In the first generation, all consumers decide on whether or not 
to buy the product for the first time. At the end of this generation, there are two different 
groups of consumers. The first consists of those who bought the product. Their 
experience with the product has changed their price sensitivity. The size of this group is 
given by (Pr(α0, X1, P1)) and their price sensitivity changes to 1. The second is the 
group of customers that did not buy it, with size (1- Pr(α0, X1, P1)) and price sensitivity 
stays as 0. This is illustrated in Figure 1.   
Insert Figure 1 here 
In the second generation, the group of consumers that did not purchase yet 
decides whether to purchase or not for the first time with probability Pr(α0, X2, P2) while 
the group of consumers that already purchased once decides whether to repurchase or not 
with probability Pr(α1, X2, P2). Recall that members of this latter group will only consider 
repurchasing if the quality of the new generation is higher than the product he or she 
already owns.  
At the end of the second generation, there are four types of customers. Their price 
sensitivity varies from 0 to 1 and 2 according to the total number of purchases each has 
made in previous periods. This process is repeated for all generations. The total sales in 
any generation g is given by the sum of all probabilities across all 2g segments of 
consumers. Each segment is associated with a different price sensitivity and a different 
level of quality necessary to motive replacement buying.   
3.3 Optimality Conditions for the Myopic Firm  
  
We first assume that the firm is myopic. The firm sets its price and quality level to 
maximize profit in a given generation without regard to the future. (Later, we relax this 
assumption to allow for forward-looking behavior). All consumers are exposed to the 
optimal price *gP  and quality 
*
gX  in generation g. The objective function g is given by: 
(6)                             gggg SMCP )( −=pi  
 where:   2210)( gggg XrXrrXMC ++=
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In the first period, all purchases by consumers are initial purchases. This 
simplifies the expression S1 as follows:  
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The first order conditions for the maximization of 1 are given by: 
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In an appendix (available from the authors), we show that any level of price and 
quality (P1*, X1*) satisfying these conditions is a unique maximum for 1 
In subsequent generations, the firm’s profit function changes from one that is 
well-behaved and continuous to one characterized by discontinuities. These 
discontinuities are the result of the replacement rule. Recall that an experienced customer 
will only consider a replacement purchase if the quality of the current generation product 
is superior to that of the product the customer last purchased. For example, in the second 
generation, if the firm considers quality levels below the optimal level associated with the 
first period (i.e., *1X ), demand will only come from those consumers who have yet to 
purchase. However, above this value, the profit function includes repeat purchases. Due 
to this discontinuity, we have a piece-wise continuous objective function. In Figure 2, we 
illustrate the discontinuity in profit function at the second period, given the optimal 
  
quality level of the first period ( *1X ). 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The objective function for the firm has no closed form solution given the two 
influences of past purchasing on the optimal price and quality for a given generation of 
the product. First, the number of purchases made by each individual consumer affects the 
price sensitivity. Second, depending on the generation in which a given consumer made 
his or her last purchase, each will have a different quality hurdle for repurchasing.  
Due to the discontinuities illustrated in Figure 2, we have to consider the quality 
levels of products sold in the past. Each level of quality creates a discontinuity in the 
objective function, and separates the quality solution space into 2g subspaces where the 
number of generations g is also the number of quality levels of products sold in the past. 
To identify the optimal price and quality, we identify the 2g prices and quality levels that 
maximize the objective function over each of the 2g sub-spaces. We then compare the 
level of the objective function for all of the sub-spaces to determine the global maximum. 
5
 
3.4 Optimality Conditions for the Forward-Looking Firm  
 In this section, we formulate the forward-looking monopolist’s problem as a 
multi-period optimization. At the start of the first period, the forward-looking firm 
considers all possible combinations of price and quality. The firm also anticipates the 
consumers’ purchase decisions for each possible combination of price and quality for all 
periods. Then, given that set of information, the firm picks the price trajectory (Pg=1 .. 
Pg=G) and quality trajectory (Xg=1 .. Xg=G) for all generations that yield the largest overall 
profit. Given that we are assuming the firm is forward looking, there is no need to revise 
the decision after the first period, as all consumers will behave as expected. 
As the number of generations grows, this problem quickly becomes very difficult 
to solve because it has two processes subject to the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 
2003). First, the number of price and quality trajectories grows exponentially with g. 
Second, the number of consumer groups (shown in Figure 1) also grows exponentially 
with g.  
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 The myopic optimization method was implemented in Mathematica 5.1; code is available from 
the authors 
  
For example, assume a firm is deciding among three quality levels, and four price 
levels. In the first period, the firm will face 3 x 4 = 12 combinations of price and quality 
levels. In the second period, there will be 122=144 combinations. In the fifth period, there 
will be 125=248,832 combinations of price and quality levels. Additionally, by the fifth 
period there will be 25 = 32 groups of consumers. Thus, in a simple multi-period 
optimization with five generations, the firm has to compute and keep track of 248,832 
combinations of price and quality for 32 groups of consumers.  
Finding the Optimal Price and Quality Trajectory 
Each of these 12g x 2g cells indicates purchase probabilities Pr(αc, Xg, Pg) for all 
consumer groups, for all combinations of quality and price levels, and for all generations. 
To find [P*1 .. P*G] and [X*1 .. X*G], the firm must do three more steps, conditional on 
each one of the 12g price and quality trajectories. First, the firm must compute sales and 
partial profits for each generation, both conditional on price and quality trajectories. 
Second, it must compute the total profit, also conditional on a price and quality trajectory. 
Finally, the firm just chooses the price and quality trajectory that yields the highest total 
profit {pi | P1.. PG , X1.. XG} .  
Conditional sales, { Sg | P1 .. PG,  X1 .. XG}, are simply the summation of all 
purchase probabilities { Pr(α 
. 
, Xg, Pg) | P1 .. PG,  X1 .. XG} within each generation, across 
all consumer groups with different consumption levels. Partial profits are computed for 
each generation as {pi g,Xg,Pgpartial | P1.. PG,X1.. XG} = Pg − MCg( ){Sg | P1.. PG ,X1.. XG} . Total 
profit conditional on a trajectory{pi | P1.. PG , X1.. XG} is simply the discounted summation 
of {pig,Xg,Pgpartial | P1.. PG,X1.. XG}across all G generations for that trajectory.  
A Complete Representation of the Solution of the Multi Period Problem   
The Bellman equation accounts for profits from acting optimally in current 
generation as well as the discounted profits from acting optimally in the future.  
 Profits in generation g for consumer with c past purchases are based on the 
probabilities of purchase Pr(αc, Xg, Pg) at generation g for consumer with number of 
purchases c, the price Pg that consumer paid at that generation, marginal costs, and a 
replacement variable ∆g,c that indicates if the purchase actually happened or not at that 
point. Thus, we write the immediate reward IR(g,c) as: 
  
 (10) IR (g,c) = ηc,g (Pg − MCg )∆ g,c  
where, for ease of exposition, let ηc,g = Pr(ac, Xg ,Pg )be the probability of the customers 
with c past purchases buying the product at price Pg and quality Xg. Marginal cost MCg 
are a function of quality (Xg). The term  ∆g,c  is a replacement indicator.   
 (11) ∆ g,c =
1   if  Xh < Xg
  0    otherwise   
 
 
 
 
Where h is the generation in which the last purchase occurred for these consumers and, 
therefore, Xh is the quality level of the product the consumers already own. 
 The discounted reward for continuing to act optimally in the future has two parts. 
First, if a consumer made a purchase [probability given by Pr(αc, Xg, Pg)], his or her 
price sensitivity ac is updated to αc+1. If the consumer did not make a purchase 
[probability given by 1- Pr(αc, Xg, Pg)], his price sensitivity stays as αc. In both cases we 
discount future profits by a rate a=1/R which reflects how much the firm values future 
profits. So, our continuation reward has two terms as follows:  
(12) 1
R
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 
 
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Having derived the immediate reward (eq. 10) and the continuation reward 
(eq.12), we are able to derive the Bellman equation as follows: 
  
(13)  pi(g,c, 1
R
) = MaxXg ,Pg
ηc,g(Pg − MCg)∆g,c +
1
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 The solution to equation 13 is the set of price and quality levels for generations 
1..G that maximize overall profits6 given all generations and groups of consumers with 
different consumption history.  
4. Study Design 
 We wish to understand the potential effects of sensitization and habituation (as 
well as the replacement rule) on the optimal price and quality of a durable good across 
multiple generations. To this end, we focused on two forms of firm decision making: 
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 The forward-looking optimization method was implemented in C#. Code is available from the authors. 
  
myopic and forward-looking. In the first set of scenarios, we assume that firms are 
myopic. We examine the separate effects of sensitization or habituation. This is followed 
by a scenario wherein sensitization is followed by habituation.  
 In the second set of scenarios, we assume that the firm is forward-looking. We 
concentrate on the most interesting scenario where sensitization is followed by 
habituation. For these analyses, we vary the rate at which future profits are discounted. 
This allows us to better compare the outcomes under the assumptions on firm behavior 
(i.e. myopic versus forward-looking).   
4.1 Baseline Numerical Solution 
In order to compare results across different situations of changing price 
sensitivities (based on purchase history), we identified a set of parameters that creates a 
realistic baseline (e.g., positive profits) against which we could analyze relative 
movements. For the cost parameters, we used the following: (r0= 1, r1= 0.4, r2= 0.05). 
This cost function allows some influence of the quadratic term on marginal costs. The 
initial price and quality sensitivities were set to unity (0 = 0 = 1.0).  
4.2 Scenarios for Myopic Firm 
Our analysis departs from the baseline where all purchases are first purchases 
(i.e., in the first generation) and all coefficients are fixed (the parameters were presented 
in the previous section). We analyzed three scenarios by changing separately price 
sensitivity as shown in Figure 3. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
We ran our analysis over ten generations. In scenario A, we decrease price 
sensitivity for the individual at two different rates (i.e., -0.05, -0.10) each time a 
purchase is made. In scenario B, we increase price sensitivity linearly at the rate of 0.10 
for every purchase7. The baseline market-level propensity for category purchase was 
0= -1.79. The optimal price and quality for the first generation is X*= 6 and P* = 6.3. 
This results in a profit of 10.9 and a first generation penetration rate of 10%. This level 
of market adoption is consistent with empirical research on innovation diffusion 
(Mahajan, Muller and Wind 2000).8 
                                                 
7
 There are no differences beyond rounding errors for different increases in price sensitivity.  
8
 We also tested other initial levels of 0, 0, and 0. The results differ from those presented here in their 
  
Scenario C is the sensitization-habituation scenario. Here, the price sensitivity is 
decreasing during the first periods, corresponding to the sensitization stage. The 
minimum price sensitivity is reached either after the third or sixth purchase. At this 
point, habituation begins and price sensitivity increases with every subsequent purchase. 
For this scenario, the per-purchase rate of change is -0.10 for sensitization and +0.10 for 
habituation.  
To better illustrate the impact of price sensitization-habituation, we set the 
baseline market-level propensity for category purchase to 0= -0.75. As before, the 
optimal price and quality for the first generation is X*= 6 and P* = 6.3 resulting in a 
profit of $35 and a first generation penetration rate of 25%, a level that includes both 
innovators and early adopters Mahajan, Muller and Wind 2000).  
One important simplification in our numerical analysis is the operationalization 
of the replacement rule. We assume that the current generation product need only have 
strictly higher levels of quality in order to be considered for purchase by consumers who 
already own a previous generation of the product.  
4.3 Scenarios for Forward-Looking Firm 
 As noted above, the forward-looking firm must account for the dependencies that 
arise due to the replacement rule and the changes in price sensitivities due to past 
purchases. Thus the solution space grows exponentially with every generation. For 
example, consider the problem facing a firm optimizing over 8 generations. If the firm 
restricts itself to four discrete levels of price and three levels of quality, there are 128 = 
429,981,696 possible paths to be evaluated. Therefore, we restricted our analysis to a 
five generation timeframe and the aforementioned 12 combinations of price and quality 
per generation. In this case we must compute the probabilities in Figure 1 a total of 125 
times, one for each price-quality trajectory. One example of a price-quality trajectory is 
(X1=4, X2=4, X3=6, X4=6, X5=6; P1=4, P2=4, P3=4, P4=4, P5=9). 
 The price levels considered are {4, 6.3, 9, 11) and the quality levels were {4, 6, 
8}. These levels include the first period solution for the myopic firm (P1,Q1) = (6.3,6) as 
well as higher and lower levels of both price and quality. We determined the optimal 
                                                                                                                                                
absolute magnitude but not their qualitative nature. They are omitted to conserve space and are available 
from the authors.  
  
price and quality levels for the forward-looking firm for a high (1/R = 0.7) and low (1/R 
= 0.95) discount rate. In order to conserve space, we focused our analysis on the 
situation in which price sensitization is followed by habituation after two purchases. 
Price sensitivity as a function of the number of purchases is illustrated in Figure 4.  
5. Results 
For each of the scenarios, we present the optimal levels of price, quality, value 
(quality/price), unit sales and profits (undiscounted) scaled with respect to the first 
generation (= 1.0). We also present the proportion of repeat purchases by generation.  
5.1 Myopic Firm Scenario A: Decreasing Price Sensitivity (Sensitization) 
When a consumer’s price sensitivity is reduced with each purchase, the myopic 
firm’s optimal strategy is to offer increased quality accompanied by even higher prices 
(see Figures 4A and 4B). These differences are more pronounced when the decrease in 
price sensitivity per purchase is larger (0.10 versus 0.05).  
Figure 4 about here 
The overall result of this strategy is a reduction in the value of firm’s offering 
with each generation compared to the first generation product (see Figure 4C). This result 
is quite different from the results obtained by Kornish (2001) who assumed zero marginal 
costs and exogenously set quality. In her model, a firm either follows a low initial price 
strategy or focuses on customers with the highest valuation for the product. In the former 
case, the first period price is set low to attract as many buyers as possible. In the second 
period, the price of the greatly improved product is set higher in order to continued to be 
attractive to those consumers placing the greatest value on the product. The high 
valuation consumers are the focus in the first period when the firm employs the latter 
strategy. Here, the first period price is set high. Some low valuation customers buy in the 
second period (as do the high valuation customers) when the greatly improved 
replacement product in introduced at an increased, but very attractive price. While 
Kornish’s (2001) analysis does not explicitly model the relationship between price and 
quality, it seems clear that, for both strategies, the firm increases the value for customers 
in the second period order to spur repeat purchases. 
Our analysis suggests that if quality increases variable costs significantly (i.e. 
variable costs is a convex function of quality), then the myopic firm can increase profits 
  
by offering a higher quality product at much higher price. This is due to the influence of 
experience on price sensitivities. The consumer who has already purchased the product 
has lower price sensitivity than those who have yet to buy the product. Some of these 
experienced consumers are willing to repurchase in future periods to gain access to the 
higher levels of quality. Total sales, which consist of replacement sales along with sales 
to remaining potential first time buyers, generally increase over time (see Figure 4D). 
With each generation, the proportion of repeat sales increases (see Figure 4E).  
One interesting result is the peaking of unit sales in later generations when the 
reductions in price sensitivity are larger (0.10 versus 0.05). Even though sales fall off 
after the eighth generation, overall profits continue to be high due to the number of 
experienced customers continuing to repurchase despite prices climbing much faster than 
quality.  
5.2 Myopic Firm Scenario B: Increasing Price Sensitivity (Habituation) 
In this scenario, when a customer purchases the product, his or her price 
sensitivity increases. In this case, the optimal strategy for the myopic firm is to keep 
quality fixed and slightly reduce the price over time9. The price reductions, overall, are 
small. This is a sharp contrast with scenario A (i.e. consumer price sensitivity declines 
with each purchase) wherein by the tenth generation prices had increased 70% and 
quality had increased almost 50%.  
Figure 5 about here 
With each generation, more consumers try the product. However, there are no 
repeat purchases and profits fall with each generation (see Figure 5).  
While the myopic firm in this scenario is exhibiting classical skim pricing 
behavior, the underlying assumptions differ from the usual ones used in model those 
usually used to model durable pricing behavior. For example, the extant research assumes 
a heterogeneous distribution of consumers, some of whom would value buying the 
product more than others. In Coase (1972), these differences are operationalized as 
reservation prices. In addition, consumers are assumed to make only one purchase of the 
infinitely durable product. Quality is usually assumed to be fixed and the cost structure is 
                                                 
9
 The results are essentially identical (within machine error) for the case of increasing price sensitivity by 
0.05 and 0.10 per purchase. They are omitted to conserve space and are available from the authors.  
  
one of low unit costs and high fixed costs. Our model relies on very different 
assumptions. Our consumers start out as being homogeneous, only changing as they 
purchase the product and become more price sensitive. A consumer would make 
replacement purchases if the quality were sufficiently high. Quality is endogenous and 
we assume that fixed costs are zero and unit costs are a quadratic function of quality. In 
the current literature on monopolists using price discrimination over time, the usual 
assumption is that the firm and consumers are forward looking. In this scenario, both 
consumers and the firm are myopic. Yet, the optimal strategy for the firm is the same, i.e. 
reduce prices over time as the market saturates. This suggests that skim pricing is an 
optimal strategy in a much wider range of situations than have been studied to date.   
5.3 Myopic Firm Scenario C: Price Sensitization Followed by Habituation 
In this scenario, price sensitivity varies according to the pattern identified in the 
sensitization-habituation literature (Wathieu 2004). During sensitization, a consumer’s 
price sensitivity decreases with each purchase. However, after a number of purchases, the 
consumer becomes satisfied with the product last purchased and his or her price 
sensitivity increases. We modeled two situations, one in which habituation occurs after 
the third purchase and the other in which habituation occurs only after the sixth purchase 
(recall that in Scenario A, habituation did not occur regardless of the number of 
replacement purchases by the consumers). We determined the optimal price and quality 
for the myopic firm across the generations for the same baseline case used in the other 
scenarios.  
We used a sensitization and habituation rate of 0.10 per purchase. Recall that 
changed the baseline market-level propensity for category purchase (0) to result in an 
initial trial rate of 25%. The results are presented in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 about here 
We see the impact of habituation in the leveling off of increases in price and 
quality (see Figures 6A and 6B). At this point, some of the first generation buyers will 
have made multiple replacement purchases and would have reached habituation. These 
consumers became more price sensitive, leading to a low likelihood of further 
purchasing. It is very interesting to note that after quality has reached its highest point, 
the firm starts to reduce prices to motivate more repeat and initial purchases. The value of 
  
the firm’s offering is relatively higher when habituation sets in after fewer purchases 
(Figure 6C). In addition, unit sales fall off more swiftly when habituation sets in with 
fewer purchases (Figure 6D).  
As might be expected from its dampening effect on price increases, habituation 
reduces the firm’s profits. Profits are lower for the earlier onset case (3 purchases) since 
it takes fewer repurchases to get to the point that consumers leave the market (Figure 6F). 
When habituation is delayed until after the sixth purchase, the firm can continue to sell 
high quality and very high priced products to a narrowing group of repeat buyers and 
some new buyers. However, the increase in unit revenue cannot off-set the fall in unit 
sales and overall profits slump severely after the eighth generation.  
 These results suggest that if a firm is successful in attracting a large number of 
buyers in the first generation, it may eventually find itself providing higher quality than 
the market is willing to pay for. The onset of habituation results in a steep fall-off in 
profits after generations of successful product introductions and steeply growing profits. 
This overshooting of quality is well-known and has been dubbed as, “performance 
oversupply” by Christensen (1997). 
 Market leaders are rewarded with increasing profits over time by supplying their 
most demanding customers with additional performance and charging extra for it. These 
firms tend to assume consumers will be consistently interested in higher levels of 
performance, regardless of price (consistent with Scenario A). However, in industry after 
industry, Christensen (1997) finds firms tend to provide more performance than 
consumers need or are willing to pay for and eventually suffer the consequences of a 
steep drop-off in sales and profits. These results suggest that the onset of habituation can 
account for the phenomenon of performance oversupply.  
In the next section, we examine how the time horizon (discount rate) of a 
forward-looking firm affects decisions regarding price and quality when price 
sensitization is followed by habituation after a small number of purchases. This analysis 
will help us better understand the role of the firm’s time horizon on the incidence of 
performance oversupply.   
5.4 Forward-Looking Firm Scenario D: Price Sensitization Followed by Habituation 
 For this scenario, we modeled two situations corresponding to a relatively high 
  
(1/R = 0.7 per period) and relatively low (1/R = 0.95 per period) discount rate. The 
optimal price and quality levels of a forward-looking with a high discount rate start low 
and rapidly rise to their highest possible levels within three generations (Figure 7A and 
7B).  After that generation, the firm cuts its price while maintaining high quality. This 
echoes the pattern of the myopic firm discussed above (Scenario C). Like the myopic 
firm, the forward-looking firm with a high discount rate suffers from a steep fall off in 
profits (Figure 7F).  
Figure 7 about here 
 
In contrast, the forward-looking firm with a low discount rate builds its base of customers 
more gradually. This is indicated by the lack of repeat buyers in the second generation 
(Figure 7E). The value of its offerings is higher than that of the high discount rate firm 
until the last generation (Figure 7C). Overall, profits for the low discount rate firm are 
much higher in the last generation since there are so many more customers interested in 
trading up to the ultimate model (Figure 7F).   
7. Discussion  
 In this paper, we develop a model to understand how changes in price sensitivity 
affect the firm’s optimal price and quality as it introduces multiple generations of a 
durable good. Our model differs from the extant literature in two respects: replacement 
purchase motivation and the pattern of changes in price sensitivity. The consumers in our 
model are motivated to purchase a replacement product if the current generation offers 
better quality than the product most recently purchased (Rogers 1995). With respect to 
price sensitivities, we model the effects of price sensitization and habituation separately 
as well as together. These differences in the demand model provide valuable insight into 
durable good pricing in markets not characterized by the typical assumptions used in the 
extant literature. We summarize our findings in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
When price sensitivity decreases with each purchase (Scenario A), the optimal 
strategy for the firm is to offer a higher quality product at a much higher price. We 
actually observe this type of pricing behavior in markets where providing higher quality 
is very expensive. For example, consider the market for high performance cycling parts 
  
used in racing. In order to maximize his or her speed, a cyclist wants the lightest possible 
bicycle frame and components. At the same time, the materials used must be very strong 
in order to safely endure the strains of racing. These demands result in situations such as 
a 2.8 pound bicycle frame selling for $4100 at the same time that a frame weighting 
slightly more (3.1 ponds) costs only half as much (Pressman 2005).  
In contrast to the recreational rock climbers studied by Youn, Song and 
MacLahan (2007), as competitive athletes progress in their sport, their price sensitivity 
often diminishes. That is, they are willing to pay increasingly high prices for only 
marginally higher quality. In bicycle case cited above, higher quality materials lead to 
reduced weight. Such behavior on the part of consumers may seem irrational, appearing 
similar to addiction. However, depending on the circumstances, the greatly increased 
price for a marginal gain in quality could be well justified. One clear example is 
equipment markets for sports such as golf, tennis, competitive fishing or racing. What 
these sports have in common is a tournament payoff structure. In other words, the payoff 
for finishing first (e.g., winning the U.S. Open, Indy 500 or Tour de France) is 
dramatically higher than the reward for those who finish second. At the highest levels of 
competition, athletes continually replace functioning equipment with new versions that 
have slightly higher performance and substantially higher prices. Under a tournament 
payoff structure, the additional expenditure contributing to even slightly improved 
performance may be rewarded.  
 When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (Scenario B), the optimal 
strategy is a skim pricing strategy. The firm sets a constant level of quality and reduces 
price over time as the market saturates. As noted above, this finding arises from a model 
that changes almost all of the assumptions regarding consumers (heterogeneity, forward 
looking v. myopic, single purchase v. replacement buying) and costs (nature of 
relationship between fixed and variable) that are used in the current literature.  
 Building on Wathieu (2004)’s exploration of how sensitization and habituation 
affects consumer purchasing, we illustrate its effects on the myopic (Scenario C) and 
forward-looking firm (Scenario D). We see that an earlier onset of habituation reduces 
the myopic firm’s price, quality, sales and profits. Furthermore, the myopic firm or a 
prescient firm with a high discount rate will find itself providing higher quality than the 
  
market is willing to pay for. The onset of habituation results in a steep fall-off in profits 
after generations of successful product introductions and increasing profits.  
 Overshooting of quality in the market place was identified as, “performance 
oversupply” by Christensen (1997). Market leaders are rewarded with increasing profits 
over time by supplying their most demanding customers with additional performance and 
charging extra for it. These firms tend to assume consumers will be consistently 
interested in higher levels of performance, regardless of price (consistent with Scenario 
A). However, in industry after industry, Christensen (1997) finds firms tend to provide 
more performance than consumers need or are willing to pay for and eventually suffer the 
consequences of a steep drop-off in sales and profits.  
 Christensen’s (1997) research is case based; it only provides a description of this 
phenomenon, not an explanation of why it occurs. Our analysis suggests that 
performance oversupply occurs due to the inflexion point between the sensitization and 
habituation processes. Consumers may continue to be interested in performance, but are 
not willing to pay for higher levels due to habituation. Since the product has a long life, 
consumers need not repurchase the latest generation even though it has higher quality. 
This leads to a steep drop off in sales and profits. Once habituation sets in, the only 
remaining course of action is to reduce prices to try to induce more repeat purchases. 
 It is interesting to note that forward looking firms with low discount rates follow a 
very different price/quality strategy. They build their customer base over multiple periods 
before greatly increasing the price and quality of the latest version. On a non-discounted 
basis, the profits from this strategy are much higher than those of the approach taken by a 
firm with a high discount rate. We often observe performance oversupply. Should we 
conclude that most managers are myopic or, at best, are forward looking but have very 
high discount rates? 
 While this question is outside the scope of this study, we speculate the managers 
may often follow a strategy that appears myopic or is inferior to one that is more forward 
looking, e.g. building up a customer base before greatly increasing price and quality 
levels. In our modeling framework, the firm is a monopolist and need not be concerned 
about competitive entry either by similar firms or ones with better (i.e. cheaper) 
technologies. It may be that firms consistently provide more quality at higher prices in 
  
order to maximize their discounted profits before the entry of new competitors or a major 
change in the production technology. Examining how competition interacts with 
consumer dynamics with respect to sensitization/habituation will be a challenging and 
interesting area for future research. 
7.1 Limitations and Conclusions 
As in Chintagunta and Rao (1996), we assumed consumers are homogeneous with 
respect to their change in preferences with each purchase. Future research might allow 
ownership (purchase) and consumption (usage) to vary separately. Also, we assumed 
homogeneous preferences at the beginning of the first period, a fixed market size and 
constant technology (as embodied in the cost structure). Relaxing these assumptions will 
provide very interesting avenues for future research.  
 In summary, we model how the influences of sensitization and habituation – first 
separately then together – affect the willingness of consumers to purchase replacement 
products in a durable good market.  By incorporating these aspects of consumer 
heterogeneity into a model of consumer demand, we examine how the firm’s decisions 
regarding price and quality change over successive generations. The findings of our 
numerical analyses provide insights into pricing behavior in understudied durable goods 
markets wherein replacement products must outperform those they replace.   
  
Figure 1 
Dynamics of Price Sensitivity (αc): 
 Probability of Purchase as Function of Previous Consumption (c), and Product Generation 
(g). 
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Figure 2: Example of Profit Function Discontinuity in Second Generation 
  
Figure 3: Changes in Price Sensitivity by Scenario 
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Figure 4 
 
Results for Myopic Scenario A: Sensitization  
(10% trial rate in 1st generation) 
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Figure 5 
 
Results for Myopic Scenario B: Habituation (10% trial rate in 1st generation) 
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Figure 6 
 
Myopic Scenario C: Sensitization followed by Habituation (25% trial rate in 1st generation) 
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Figure 7 
 
Forward-Looking Scenario D: Sensitization followed by Habituation  
(10% trial rate in 1st generation) 
 
A: Price relative to first generation 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Results 
 
Scenario Major Findings Related 
Citations 
 
A: Sensitization =  
Decreasing Price Sensitivity 
(myopic firm)  
“Addicted” to Performance 
• Prices rise much faster than quality 
• Value falls with each generation 
• Proportion of repeat buyers increases with 
every generation 
• Sales may fall as market saturates 
• May be relevant when there is a tournament 
payoff to performance gains  
Becker and 
Murphy 
(1988) 
B:  Habituation = Increasing 
Price Sensitivity  (myopic 
firm) 
Coasian Saturation 
• Price and profits fall over time 
• No repeat purchases 
• Same limit pricing outcome from very 
different initial assumptions 
 
Coase (1972) 
C: Sensitization Followed 
by Habituation (myopic 
firm) 
Performance Oversupply 
• Rapid increase in price and quality until 
habituation sets in 
• Very high peak in profits followed by sharp 
fall-off 
 
Wathieu 
(2004) 
Christensen 
(1997) 
D: Sensitization Followed 
by Habituation (forward-
looking firm) 
Discount Rate Determines Strategy 
• Low = builds customer base over multiple 
generations 
• High = performance oversupply 
 
Wathieu 
(2004) 
Christensen 
(1997) 
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